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
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STAFF NOTES:

East Asia

State Department review completed

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North Korea: Redefining the Political Committee

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A new look at the Political Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) Central Committee indicates that it is a small, stable leadership group. Previous research had suggested that the committee had expanded greatly in recent years and was relatively unstable in its lower ranks.

A reassessment of leadership appearance patterns and identifications indicates that roughly one third of the people carried as committee members for the last two years should not be listed as such. Most of those who do not belong on the committee are government administrators. They had never been confirmed as members and had seemed to move off and on the Political Committee with startling rapidity. There was considerable fluctuation in their ranking from month to month.

The high turnover rate suggested by this reporting had led analysts to believe that there was instability in party politics and significant policy failures in many administrative areas. Our new definition of the Political Committee excludes the technocrats, and ranking now indicates a five-year record of stability under the firm and fatherly hand of Kim Il-song.

The Difficulties of Definition

Difficulties in defining Political Committee membership stem from the North Korean practice of publishing full committee rosters only at party congresses and conferences. In the four-to-five year intervals between conclaves, Pyongyang does

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not announce the appointment or dismissal of committee members. A full committee was last announced at the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970.

The problem of identifying members became particularly acute after December 1972, when the revised constitution created the Central Peoples Committee (CPC) to sit above the cabinet and provide ruling party oversight of government operations. Many members of the Central Peoples Committee were confirmed Political Committee members and, as all CPC members were accorded the same honorific title "tongji," it was assumed that the remainder--although unconfirmed --also sat on the Political Committee. By equating Political Committee membership with that of the Central Peoples Committee, the Political Committee was assumed to include all but one of the secretaries of the KWP Central Committee, all vice premiers of the cabinet, and a smattering of other cabinet officials.

A New Approach


The older, expanded definition of the Political Committee produced a roster of approximately 15 full members and 17 candidates. Our redefined committee has 14 full members and only 8 candidates, a total of 22. This reduced proportion of candidates to full members is in keeping with the composition of the traditional Political Committee in North Korea.

In redefining the committee, North Korean confirmation of individuals as members is the primary criterion. Only one of the officials on the new listing--Pak Su-tong--is not confirmed. We believe, nonetheless, that his sensitive party assignments, recent strong upward movement, and high rank within the Central Peoples Committee, mark him as a new addition to the candidate roster of the Political

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
North Korea Party and Government Structure

Korean Workers Party Organization



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Government Organization



Committee. There may, in addition, be two or three other candidate members, but the evidence is not yet strong enough to include them.

Two principal factors have contributed to the decision to remove most of the unconfirmed officials from committee membership. There are increasing instances in which officials once thought to be members of the Political Committee were pointedly not identified as such when in the company of others who were. The example of Ho Tam, foreign minister and vice premier, is most notable. In April and May of this year, other members of Kim's entourage visiting China, Eastern Europe, and Africa, were listed as committee members; Ho was not. His dossier shows similar occurrences in 1973 and 1974.

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Second, the North Koreans have publicly noted that the membership of the Political Committee does not include all party secretaries and cabinet vice premiers. Thus there should be some secretaries and vice premiers who sit on the Central Peoples Committee but not on the Political Committee.

The New Roster

The revised committee membership, with approximate rankings, is as follows:

Full Members:

Kim Il-song	President, DPRK, General Secretary, KWP
Choe Yong-kon	Vice President, DPRK; Secretary, KWP
Kim Il	Vice President, DPRK; Secretary, KWP
Kim Tong-kyu	Vice President, DPRK; Secretary KWP
Choe Hyon	Minister of Defense
O Chin-u	Chief of Staff, Army; Secretary, KWP
So Chol	Chairman, Inspection Committee, KWP
Pak Song-chol	Vice Premier, DPRK
*Yi Kun-mo	Vice Premier, DPRK
Kim Chung-nin	Secretary, KWP; Chairman, Liaison Bureau, KWP

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*Yon Hyong-muk	Secretary, KWP
Kim Yong-chu	Vice Premier, DPRK; Secretary, KWP
*Yi Yong-mu	Director, Political Bureau, Army
Yang Hyong-sop	Secretary, KWP

Candidate Members:

*Yu Chang-sik	Secretary, KWP
*Kim Yong-nam	Secretary, KWP
Hyon Mu-kwang	Secretary, KWP
*Pak Su-tong	Deputy Department Chairman, KWP
*Chong Chun-ki	Vice Premier, DPRK
Han Ik-su	Secretary, KWP; Colonel General, Army
*Kang Song-san	Committee Chairman, Cabinet
*Chon Mun-sop	Colonel General, Army

All of these members, save the elderly and ailing Choe Yong-kon, are active and appear fairly regularly in public. Among those officials no longer

**Members added since November 1970.*

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included as committee members are Ho Tam, Kim Song-ae (wife of Kim Il-song), and Nam Il (currently a vice premier, and a committee member in the early 1960s). Kang Yang-uk, vice president of the DPRK and uncle of Kim Il-song, we now believe to be a member of neither the ruling party nor its Political Committee.

The Five Year Trend

Constructed on the basis of official identifications, the North Korean Political Committee forms a discrete unit at the top of the Central Peoples Committee. There is marked stability in the ranking of full Political Committee members; adjustments and promotions are more apparent in the candidate roster.

Only two of the 15 men named as Political Committee members in November 1970 are no longer serving. One died; the other--responsible for agricultural affairs--was removed from office following several years of poor harvests. An additional official, who joined the committee in 1971, was removed earlier this year in connection with North Korea's massive foreign trade deficit.

Today's committee has seven persons more than announced at the Fifth Party Congress. Nine of the 22 members have been appointed since 1970--three full members and six candidates. While we now believe that few technocrats sit on the committee, there is still a trend toward increasing specialization. Foreign affairs experts Yu Chang-sik and Kim Yong-nam exemplify both this development and the increased recruitment of men in their forties and fifties.

The most dramatic changes in rank since 1970 include the promotion of Kim Tong-kyu to the post of DPRK vice president, the advancement of military chiefs Choe Hyon and O Chin-u, and the downgrading

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of Kim Yong-chu who was once regarded as the most likely successor to his brother Kim Il-song. Han Ik-su, a colonel general in the army, seems to have suffered the highly unusual fate of demotion from full to candidate membership, but the overall presence of military specialists, like that of the foreign affairs specialists, has expanded.

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Tokyo Finds Vietnamese Tough Customers

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Tokyo's earlier expectations of an imminent exchange of embassies with Hanoi may prove to be overly optimistic.

Talks between the two countries have been hung up on Hanoi's demand that Japan grant a total aid package of some \$49 million before embassies are opened. Tokyo originally had offered \$17 million, with an additional amount to be negotiated after the embassies were established.

The Japanese foreign office has apparently decided in general to meet Hanoi's demands, although it may try to negotiate a slightly lower figure. The Finance Ministry, however, opposes concessions to Hanoi, partly because of fears of an adverse US reaction. Even if the foreign office can achieve a consensus within the government, Diet approval would be required, since only \$17 million has been legally allocated for aid to North Vietnam. Diet approval could not be obtained before this fall at the earliest, when an extraordinary session of the Diet may be called to consider budget matters. Tokyo is also concerned that Hanoi may insist on Diet approval of any aid agreement before permitting Japan to open an embassy.

As for ties with Saigon, Tokyo has decided not to rush efforts to name a successor to the ambassador in Saigon, who was asked to leave by the revolutionary authorities because of his past association with the Thieu regime. Tokyo will not consider a successor until negotiations with Hanoi are completed--unless they drag on endlessly. Some exchange of views between Japanese diplomats and South Vietnamese ambassador Pham Van Ba in Paris, however, will continue.

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Although the issue apparently has not yet been raised, Tokyo expects the South Vietnamese communist regime to demand economic aid equivalent to that given the Thieu regime. The Finance Ministry in particular is known to oppose further aid to the South unless Saigon makes some effort to meet \$25 million in debt obligations incurred by the former South Vietnamese government.

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North Korea: Honoring Kim Il-song's Deceased Wife

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A campaign to idolize Kim Chong-suk, Kim Il-song's wife who died in 1949, has been quietly under way in North Korean literary journals since the latter half of 1974. The key element in the campaign is the use of honorific language which places Kim Chong-suk in the same category as Kim Il-song. Honorific speech--an integral part of the Korean language--is used to show respect to persons in socially superior positions.

In the North Korean media, the use of honorifics had been restricted to Kim Il-song and certain of his deceased relatives. Its extension to include Kim Chong-suk is significant in that it is apparently the first time that such terms have been officially used to refer to a person not related to Kim Il-song by blood. Furthermore, since she is alleged to be the mother of Kim Chong-il--a son of Kim Il-song and his rumored successor--this might be part of a campaign to transfer Kim Il-song's revolutionary heritage to his son and legitimize his claim to power.

Although it is believed that Kim Il-song's marriage to Kim Chong-suk is widely known among the North Korean people, the media seem to astutely avoid any direct mention of such a relationship. A cursory survey of newspapers and magazines published during the past year yielded only one oblique reference. (Here it should be mentioned that references to Kim Chong-il have not to date been uncovered in North Korean mass media.)

Exactly when the campaign to idolize Kim Chong-suk began is not known, but one of the earliest references to her in the honorific was in an April

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1974 article in *Kulloja*, the theoretical journal of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee. The present campaign seems to be the first time she has been referred to as "Mother Kim Chong-suk," an expression vaguely reminiscent of the appellation given the mother of Kim Il-song. The campaign is low-key, with no significant references appearing in *Nodong Sinmun*, *Minju Chocon*, and *Nodong Chongnyon*, the organ papers of the ruling party, government, and youth federation, respectively.

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ANNEX

**The Two Koreas and the United Nations:
The Debate Approaches a Critical Stage This Year**

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Both North and South Korea appear to sense that the debate on the Korean question, which has taken place almost every year at the UN for nearly three decades, may be approaching a climax. As a result, the two states and their supporters have already begun vigorous lobbying for the support of UN members, even though the fall session of the United Nations General Assembly is still several months away. Diplomats from both sides are active in New York and in capitals throughout the world, and many foreign delegations have been invited to Seoul and Pyongyang to hear their respective arguments.

The growing number of Third World countries sympathetic to North Korea in the General Assembly have taken the initiative in the Korean debate in recent years. South Korea has argued that both Seoul and Pyongyang should be given an opportunity for UN membership, pending reunification at some future time. North Korea has adamantly opposed this approach, contending that it would tend to ratify a permanent division of the country. Peking and Moscow, as well as North Korea's Third World allies, have resisted a two-Koreas solution. Consequently, the UN debate in recent years has focused not on the membership issue but on the roles of the UN and US forces in South Korea. This year, if current trends continue, it appears likely that Pyongyang's supporters will succeed in passing a resolution at the UN calling for the unconditional withdrawal from South Korea of both US forces and the UN command.

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Last year in the General Assembly North Korea's backers came close to passing such a resolution; it was defeated on a 46 to 48 tie vote, with 38 abstentions. The passage of this resolution in the General Assembly would be legally binding neither on US forces, which are stationed in the South under a bilateral agreement, nor on the UN command in South Korea, which was established by the UN Security Council and can be "terminated only" by that body. Such a resolution would, nevertheless, be a psychological and diplomatic defeat for Seoul and its supporters.

Seoul's Defense

South Korea and its supporters have accepted the principle of ending the UN role in South Korea. The problem of terminating the UN command is complicated, however, by the fact that the command was the only signatory on the allied side to the 1953 Armistice Agreement, which has provided the legal basis for the peace on the peninsula since the Korean war. (The other signatories were North Korea and China.) If the UN command were terminated unconditionally, the validity of the Armistice Agreement would be called into question.

Of particular concern in this event would be the status of the islands off the West Coast of Korea which, according to the Armistice Agreement, come under the control of the UN command. If the agreement were undefined, Pyongyang, considering the proximity of the islands to North Korea, might be tempted to assert a claim to them, something Seoul is determined to resist.

Last year South Korea's supporters in the General Assembly succeeded in passing a resolution calling on the Security Council to consider "in due course" dissolution of the UN command "in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the

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armistice agreement." The vote was 61 to 43, with 31 abstentions. The resolution has not been implemented because it requires North Korean participation and the cooperation of all permanent members of the Security Council. The North Koreans have little interest in ending the UN command in this manner, which would leave the status of US forces in South Korea unaffected.

A New Proposal

Last month the US proposed a new pro - South Korean resolution for General Assembly consideration. It carries essentially the same message as last year's resolution, but addresses the UN command-armistice issue more directly, announcing that the US and South Korea are prepared to terminate the command--on 1 January 1976--provided that the other signatories to the 1953 armistice agree that its provisions will continue in force. The US has indicated that it will designate US and South Korean officers to replace the UN command as a party to the Armistice Agreement. As an interim measure, the US is limiting the role of the UN command solely to the administration of the armistice and forming a separate headquarters to command US and ROK forces.

The North Koreans have not yet reacted to Washington's new proposal. It is almost certain, however, that Pyongyang and its backers will renew their effort this fall to pass a resolution linking the US and UN roles in South Korea and condemning both. As in the past, Pyongyang's objectives would be to isolate South Korea internationally, damage the prestige of the UN, and bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the US to withdraw its forces from South Korea.

It has been clear since the General Assembly last fall that it will be difficult to head off another pro - North Korean resolution at the UN this year. Pyongyang has only to increase slightly the

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backing it obtained last fall. While it is still too early to predict with certainty how the next Assembly will act, several factors are likely to affect the outcome.

Factors Favoring Pyongyang

Among those factors likely to favor the North Koreans are the following:

Pyongyang's success in broadening its diplomatic relations. In mid-1972 the North Koreans had diplomatic relations with 38 countries; they now have ties with some 73 states. At least nine countries have established formal diplomatic ties with the North since the General Assembly last fall--Austria, Switzerland, and Portugal in Europe; Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam in Asia; and Ethiopia and newly independent Mozambique in Africa.

Diplomatic relations do not automatically signal an additional UN vote for North Korea. Australia established relations with Pyongyang in 1974 but has continued to back Seoul in New York. Malaysia, however, abstained on the Korean resolutions at the UN last year after establishing ties with North Korea in 1973. Thailand could shift to an abstention on the pro - North Korean resolution this year, although it is also expected to back the pro-Seoul proposal.

North Korea has also strengthened its existing ties with a number of nonaligned, Third World countries in the past year, as evidenced most dramatically by Kim Il-song's trip to Eastern Europe and North Africa this spring. The North Koreans have a good chance of gaining membership in the nonaligned movement at the Lima conference in late August, which would provide an additional boost for Pyongyang. South Korea itself is working hard to gain membership in the nonaligned movement this year, in order to block a success by Pyongyang, but its efforts may

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have come too late to erode the strong position Pyongyang has built up with many years of diligent spadework.

Increasing solidarity among the nonaligned countries. At the General Assembly last year the "new majority" of developing countries, made up in large part of African and Arab states, managed to provide a sympathetic forum for the Palestine Liberation Organization, silence Israeli representatives, suspend South Africa, and endorse an economic charter sanctioning the expropriation of foreign investments. The new majority came close to winning victories for the Cambodian communists and North Korea. Of the 48 countries that voted yes on the pro - North Korean resolution, nearly half (23) were from sub-Saharan Africa and eight were Arab states.

North Korea's current "peace offensive." Following the communist victories in Indochina this spring, Pyongyang appeared to believe that the broader cause of liberation movements had been given new momentum, enhancing the prospects for the early reunification of Korea. Kim Il-song said as much in his initial, militant banquet speech in Peking in April. Since that speech, however, the North Koreans as well as the Chinese have strongly emphasized that North Korea's policy calls for peaceful reunification. In his visits to two leading nonaligned states, Yugoslavia and Algeria, Kim came across as a man with a "realistic" view of the situation in East Asia. Pyongyang's peace offensive is designed in part to enhance its argument at the UN--that tension on the Korean Peninsula is caused not by the North, but by the presence of US forces in the South.

New UN member states. Several countries will apparently become new members of the General Assembly this fall. One, Papua New Guinea, is likely to support South Korea, probably following the lead of

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Australia. Both North and South Vietnam are making soundings regarding UN membership; if they are accepted they will, of course, vote for Pyongyang. Mozambique is a sure vote for the North. There is some possibility that the Cape Verde Islands, independent since 5 July, will also become a UN member, with another vote for Pyongyang.

Factors Favoring Seoul

The factors likely to favor South Korea include the following:

The new US - South Korean resolution. The more direct US - South Korean resolution this year has the advantage of:

- sharpening the distinction between US forces and the UN command in South Korea,
- making explicit US and South Korean willingness to end the UN presence in the South, to some extent pre-empting Pyongyang's approach.

These distinctions and considerations were lost on the more radical nonaligned states last year, which were inclined to accept Pyongyang's simpler message--that both the UN command and US forces have no business in Korea. The new US - South Korean resolution will still be brushed aside this year by the radicals, but it will be a bit more difficult for the more moderate states to do so. It will take some time for full reactions to the new resolution to come in, but the early returns indicate a favorable response, which will help Seoul's case in New York.

Heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula. In spite of North Korea's current peace offensive, many foreign observers appear to share a perception that

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the situation in Korea is somewhat more dangerous now than it was several months ago. This is a result of events in Indochina and the parallels that have been drawn between the situation there and in Korea; Kim Il-song's strong language in Peking has also played a part. While the initial war scare in Seoul has eased greatly, there remain uncertainties about what comes next in Korea. A number of diplomats from western countries and more moderate Third World states have expressed the view that now is not the proper time to abolish the peacekeeping machinery in Korea. This perception will strengthen backing for the pro-Seoul resolution, which strongly emphasizes the need to preserve the armistice agreement.

Redefining the Korean Issue

Another factor that might help Seoul is a proposal that has been raised with South Korean officials by diplomats from a number of friendly countries in recent months: that the Korean debate at the UN be broadened this year to include the issue of membership for both North and South Korea. The proposal is attractive to other countries which prefer to avoid taking sides in the annual Korean discussions, and see this as an even-handed solution.

As long as the debate focuses on the UN command, and the problem of maintaining the armistice, Pyongyang has virtual veto power. As a price for its agreement to a follow-on armistice, Pyongyang is likely to hold out for a commitment from the US to withdraw its forces from South Korea. North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam strongly implied as much in a major address last fall; there has been no sign that Pyongyang's policy has changed.

A call for dual UN membership, or a "German solution," added to the present US - South Korean

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resolution, would draw stiff opposition from North Korea and its more radical Third World allies, and Pyongyang would look to Peking and Moscow to resist such a move in the Security Council, which initially passes on all membership applications. North Korea would strongly oppose any linkage between UN membership for the two Koreas and the two Vietnams. A call for dual membership from some friends of South Korea might offer tactical advantages at the UN, nevertheless, putting North Korea and its allies on the defensive, and raising an issue on which Pyongyang by itself does not have the same veto power it has on the UN command-armistice problem.

The Chinese would be most reluctant to press North Korea to accept dual membership. In 1973 Peking was instrumental in securing North Korean agreement to a compromise formula for terminating UNCURK (the UN Commission for Unification and Reconstruction of Korea), the UN political organ in Korea. Last year, however, when Pyongyang insisted on a voting showdown in the General Assembly, Peking backed the North Koreans fully. Peking has progressively strengthened its ties with North Korea in recent years and seems likely to provide Pyongyang with strong diplomatic backing again this fall.

The Soviets might be more helpful on the membership issue. Moscow's support for North Korea in the General Assembly last year was largely pro forma. This year the Soviets will want to preserve their limited equities in North Korea, but they could possibly take a position contrary to Pyongyang's interests if they perceived strong incentives in other areas. In a conversation with a US diplomat in Moscow on June 13 the Soviets indicated that they would support North Korea at the UN, but they did not show much enthusiasm. The Soviets hinted that they would favor UN membership for both parts of Korea, but that membership could not be "forced" on North Korea.

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[redacted] however, a Soviet official showed concern about a possible US veto on a South Vietnamese application for UN membership, and he strongly implied that a trade-off might be discussed whereby Moscow would support the admission of both Koreas if the US would allow both Vietnams to enter the UN.

Outlook

There are additional factors that could influence the outcome of the Korean debate over the next several months. Political repression and dissent in South Korea could diminish support for Seoul. North Korea's continuing failure to meet its foreign debt obligations promptly could weaken backing for Pyongyang to a limited degree. Tension-building incidents on the Korean Peninsula (depending on which side appears responsible) might erode support for either Seoul or Pyongyang. Bilateral problems between the US and third countries, unrelated to the Korean question, could also affect the UN voting on that issue.

Despite the uncertainties, if the Korean debate at the UN continues to focus on the UN command-armistice problem, the current trends strongly indicate that the pro - South Korean resolution will again pass, but that a pro - North Korean resolution will also pass in the General Assembly, although by a less substantial margin. The result would be an ambiguous situation in which the General Assembly, having passed essentially conflicting resolutions, would have failed to speak with a clear voice on the Korean question. Even so, North Korea and its more militant supporters would certainly acclaim the passage of their resolution as a victory that undermines the international standing of Seoul and the legitimacy of the JS position in South Korea.

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